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Abstract
We present empirical evidence on acquirer firms that have violated or are about to violate a loan
covenant within four quarters of undergoing an acquisition. We find that firms that violate a
covenant within the four quarters before the acquisition announcement have the highest
announcement period abnormal returns, while firms that violate a covenant within the four
quarters after the acquisition announcement but not within the four quarters before it have the
sharpest decline in abnormal returns after the acquisition announcement. Also, firms that violate
or are about to violate a loan covenant within four quarters have a significantly lower mean
target firm deal size than those that have not violated covenants within those time periods. Such
results indicate that when firms violate or are about to violate a loan covenant, corporate
governance shifts in power cause creditors to enforce stricter rules on management’s actions,
making sure that the acquisitions that management pursues adds to firm value.
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I. Introduction
Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2010) reveal that many corporate governance shifts of power occur
when a firm violates a loan covenant, as creditors rewrite covenants and set rules that restrict the
borrower’s actions. For example, creditors may limit capital expenditure spending and which
types of acquisitions are permitted. Regarding the topic of acquisitions, the results from Betton,
Eckbo, and Thorburn (2008) and Amira, John, Prezas, and Vasudevan (2009) reveal that
abnormal returns are significantly positive around the announcement period for an acquisition.
Combining the material of all these papers, we wonder about the effect of loan covenant
violations on the effectiveness of a borrower’s business decisions, as shifts of power occur across
the parties related to the borrower. We use acquisition announcement period abnormal returns to
measure this effect based on the stock market’s perception of the acquirer.
We hope that our research provides a better understanding of corporate governance,
allowing readers to have a clearer view of who is in charge (creditors, board of directors,
management, etc.) and how the actions of certain groups influence the company’s market value.
From our analysis of acquisition announcement period returns, readers will have a better
understanding of whether firms make better business decisions after they violate loan covenants
and which factors affect the market’s perception of these decisions the most.
The main research question that we focus on is whether there are differences among
acquirer firms that have violated a loan covenant within the four quarters before the acquisition
announcement (Violation Before Acquisition), acquirer firms that have violated a loan covenant
within the four quarters after the acquisition announcement but not within the four quarters
before (Violation After Acquisition), and acquirer firms that have not experienced such
violations (No Violation). Violation Before Acquisition and Violation After Acquisition act as
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treatment groups, while No Violation acts as a control group. The differences that we are
interested in are those for acquisition announcement period abnormal returns as well as those for
the following acquisition type characteristics: target firm deal size, industry match between
acquirer and target, and deal financing type.
We first compare the abnormal returns for the three samples by using Eventus, an event
study program, and graphing the mean cumulative abnormal returns to determine the trends and
magnitudes of each sample’s mean cumulative abnormal return across time and around the
announcement period. From the graphs, we notice that Violation Before Acquisition’s
cumulative mean abnormal return rose the most dramatically at the announcement period, and
Violation After Acquisition’s cumulative mean abnormal return falls the most dramatically after
the announcement period. The rise in Violation Before Acquisition’s cumulative mean abnormal
return at the announcement period may support the hypothesis that after loan covenant
violations, creditors control the firm’s management more strictly, limiting the allowed
acquisitions to only those that generate value to the firm. The stock market’s favorable view of
this shift in corporate governance may be reflected in the rise in abnormal returns. Violation
After Acquisition’s dramatic drop in mean cumulative abnormal return after the announcement
period may indicate both that the market overreacts positively to acquisition announcement, and
that the stock market’s pessimistic prediction of an impending loan covenant violation begins to
override its optimistic sentiment towards the acquisition.
For the acquisition type characteristics, we use two-tailed t-tests to test for statistically
significant mean differences. We find that the only significant differences occur for target firm
deal size between Violation Before Acquisition and No Violation, and between Violation After
Acquisition and No Violation. This may be evidence that when firms violate a covenant or are
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about to violate a covenant, creditors may limit the deal size of acquisitions to avoid overly large
acquisitions, which may be both too expensive and too risky.
The results of our analysis reveal that stock markets have favorable announcement period
reactions towards companies that undergo an acquisition after violating a loan covenant and that
acquirers that violate a loan covenant have smaller target firm deal sizes than those that do not.
These results may support Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2010), providing further evidence that many
corporate governance shifts of power occur when a firm violates a loan covenant, as creditors
rewrite covenants and set rules that restrict the borrower’s actions, such as which types of
acquisitions are permitted.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II touches upon background
information, including explanations of concepts and research results from related literature.
Section III outlines the hypotheses and research that supports them. In Section IV, we explain the
details of our datasets. Next, we explain our methodology for data analysis in Section V. Then
we analyze the results of our research in Section VI. Section VII concludes.

II. Background
A. Covenant Violations
Debt covenants are conditions in credit agreements that direct or restrict the borrower’s
actions. There are three categories of covenants: affirmative, negative, and financial. Affirmative
covenants force the borrower to take certain actions, such as meeting GAAP standards of
accounting, maintaining equipment and buying insurance, and operating within legal bounds.
Negative covenants restrict the borrower from taking certain actions, such as shifting the firm’s
main business, divesting assets, and making excessive capital expenditures. Financial covenants
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are accounting-based risk and performance limits, restricting measures, such as a firm’s leverage
and interest coverage.
Covenants occur in all types of debt agreements, including bond and note indentures, but
are typically much stricter in private loan agreements (Kahan and Tuckman (1993), Gilson and
Warner (1998), Verde (1999), and Sansone and Taylor (2007)). Private loan contracts have
maintenance covenants, meaning that the borrower must comply with the covenant consistently,
for example by maintaining a certain debt/EBITDA ratio on a quarterly basis. On the other hand,
bond indentures have incurrence covenants, for which the borrower only needs to comply with
the covenant during a particular event, such as only having to maintain a certain debt/EBITDA
ratio during a debt or equity issuance. Between the two types of contracts, private loan contracts
are much stricter because they must use the more restrictive maintenance-based covenants.
Violations of covenants are considered events of default, which allow the creditor to
demand immediate repayment of (or “accelerate”) the entire loan balance. However, the creditor
rarely accelerates the loan and instead, usually renegotiates the contract with the borrower. Such
renegotiations can lead to modifications of the loan terms and more restrictions on certain
metrics of the firm, such as stricter limits on leverage, capital expenditures, and acquisitions (See
Figure 1). After a covenant violation, clear limits on capital expenditures are likely to be set for
the first time, and ratio-based covenants are replaced by restrictions on the level of EBITDA
(Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2010)). Figures 2 and 3 reveal that loan covenant violations cause
decreases in a firm’s abnormal returns.
B. Acquisitions
Much existing research covers acquisitions. For a summary of various types of research
on acquisitions, see “Corporate Takeovers” by Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2008). Our interest
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in this paper lies in the studies concerning takeover gains. These studies use a sample of 15,987
initial control bids by public bidders for public or private targets, in the time period from 1980 to
2005. For the cumulative abnormal stock returns, an average daily abnormal stock return is
measured for firm j over event window k as the event parameter ARjk according to
rjt = αj + βjrmt + ∑


  + εjt, t = day{−293, ..., end}

where rjt is the return (in logarithmic form) to firm j over day t, rmt is the value-weighted market
return, and dkt is a dummy variable that equals one if day t is in the kth event window and zero
otherwise. Day 0 is the day of the initial control bid, and days -1 to 1 is the announcement
period. For the announcement period for the whole sample of 15,987 initial control bids, the
mean cumulative abnormal stock return is 0. 73% and has a z-statistic of -2.5297. This indicates
that the return is significantly positive, at a level of confidence of 0.01. However, 49.39% of the
sample size is made up of positive returns, revealing that most returns are negative.
Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2008) extends this data analysis further by dividing their
sample of 15,987 initial control bids into subsamples based of the following factors: bidder
market capitalization of the target, whether the target was public or private, form of initial bid,
method of payment of initial offer, and time period of initial offer. Out of these factors, they
determined that the two key drivers of acquirer (bidder) returns are bidder size and the target’s
status as public or private. For bidder market capitalization subsamples, which allow one to
examine the effect of the bidder’s size on announcement period returns, the sample is divided
into the lowest quartile and highest quartile. For the lowest quartile, consisting of 3,995 initial
bids, the mean cumulative abnormal return is 4.04%, the z-statistic is 21.7874, and 58.27% of
returns are positive. For the highest quartile, consisting of 10,480 initial bids, the mean
cumulative abnormal return is -0.49%, the z-statistic is -17.5109, and 45.99% of returns are
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positive. These results indicate that the returns are inversely related to bidder size, with the
lowest quartile having a mean cumulative abnormal return 4.53% higher than that of the highest
quartile. One can also see the influence of the target’s status as public or private on the acquirer’s
announcement period cumulative abnormal return. For an acquirer with a public target, of which
there are 6,301 initial bids, the mean cumulative abnormal return is -0.87%, the z-statistic is 19.0462, and 42.69% of returns are positive. For an acquirer with a private target, of which there
are 9,686 initial bids, the mean cumulative abnormal return is 1.76%, the z-statistic is 12.1118,
and 53.75% of returns are positive. Therefore, acquirers with private targets have higher
cumulative abnormal returns than those with public targets, with acquirers with private targets
having a cumulative abnormal return that is higher by 2.63%.
Overall, the best-case scenario for returns consists of a small bidder (lowest quartile of
market capitalization), private target, and all-stock payment, producing an average bidder
announcement period cumulative abnormal return of 6.46%. The worst-case scenario for returns
consists of a large bidder (highest quartile of market capitalization), public target, and all-stock
payment (again), producing an average bidder announcement period cumulative abnormal return
of -2.21%.
Amira, John, Prezas, and Vasudevan (2009) also present conclusions relevant to our
research. They use cross-sectional regressions, to control for various factors for a sample of 414
US industrial firms that acquired assets between 1986 and 2001. The announcement period is
from days -1 to 1 with day 0 as the announcement of the asset purchase, and cumulative
abnormal returns are based on a single-factor market model estimated from day -255 to day -46
for each firm. The results reveal that buyer announcement period returns increase directly with
buyer leverage and are higher for buyers with private debt than those with public debt. Also,
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announcement period returns have an inverse relationship with buyer size, number of buyer’s
anti-takeover provisions, and relative size of acquisition. For the full sample, the announcement
period mean cumulative abnormal return is 1.238%, which is statistically positive at the 0.01
level of significance.
Amira, John, Prezas, and Vasudevan (2009) split up the sample to analyze the data for
debt level and type of debt. For debt level, the sample is divided into high debt and low debt
asset buyers, with “high debt asset buyers” defined as firms with a total debt-to-total asset ratio
higher than median ratio for all firms that bought assets in the same year and “low debt asset
buyers” as the opposite. The mean cumulative abnormal return for high debt asset buyers, which
make up a sample size of 203, is 1.813%, which is statistically different from zero at the 0.01
level of significance. The mean cumulative abnormal return for low debt asset buyers, which
make up a sample size of 211, is 1.686%, which is statistically different from zero at the 0.01
level of significance. From these mean cumulative abnormal returns it is evident that asset
buyers with higher total debt-to-total asset ratios have higher returns, confirming that
announcement period returns increase along with buyer leverage. For debt type, the sample is
divided into public debt and private debt asset buyers, with “public debt asset buyers” defined as
firms with a public-to-private debt ratio greater than one, and “private debt asset buyers” as the
opposite. The mean cumulative abnormal return for private debt asset buyers, which make up a
sample size of 170, is 2.343%, which is statistically different from zero at the 0.01 level of
significance. The mean cumulative abnormal return for public debt asset buyers, which make up
a sample size of 244, is 0.469%. These mean cumulative abnormal returns indicate that private
debt asset buyers have higher announcement period returns than public debt asset buyers.

8

III. Hypotheses
A. Announcement Period Abnormal Returns
We think that announcement period abnormal returns for Violation Before Acquisition
and Violation After Acquisition are larger than those for No Violation. We also feel that
Violation Before Acquisition has the highest abnormal returns and that No Violation has the
lowest. Based on the findings from Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2010), creditors impose tighter
restrictions on borrowers following a loan violation. Therefore, we think that these restrictions
only allow firms to make acquisitions that add to the firms’ value, and that the benefits of these
acquisitions are reflected by the stock price around the announcement period.
In addition, we think that the acquirers that Violation After Acquisition have the second
highest abnormal returns because even though they have not yet actually violated a loan
covenant, their financial position must be deteriorating, leading to their eventual violation.
Therefore, even though creditors have not imposed rules as strict as those following a loan
violation, creditors are likely to caution and guide the struggling company. A possible alternative
hypothesis for Violation Before Acquisition having the highest abnormal returns may be that
these firms have suffered an overdramatic decline in their stock price after the actual loan
covenant violation. As a result, the stock market sees the ability to carry out an acquisition as a
sign that the market overreacted to the violation, resulting in enormously positive stock returns.
B. Types of Acquisitions
In addition to our predictions for announcement period abnormal returns, we think that
Violation Before Acquisition and Violation After Acquisition have smaller target sizes, less
across industry deals, and more all-stock financed deals. In addition, we think that acquirers that
have violated a loan covenant within the previous four quarters exhibit these characteristics the
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most. These predictions come from Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2010), which indicates that the cash
acquisitions scaled by average assets decreases greatly after a covenant violation. We think that
this implies that creditors may limit the size of all acquisitions that occur close to the date that a
covenant violation occurs or is likely to occur, in order to guide the firm to engage only in
acquisitions that increase the firm’s value. We also think that these creditors guide violating
acquirers towards deals in which the industry of the buyer and seller match and most likely result
in higher returns due to synergies. In addition, since Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2008) reveals
that acquirers with all-stock deals yield the higher announcement period abnormal returns, we
think that creditors make sure that violating acquirers pursue deals that are financed by stock.
However, we are unsure about this hypothesis because the same research shows that all-stock
deals also yield the lowest announcement period abnormal returns.

IV. Data
A. Previous Construction
The two sets of data used in our research are a sample of acquisitions and a sample of
covenant violations. One set of data consists of 15,211 acquisitions from 1996 to 2010. We use
about 8,750 of these acquisitions when analyzing the announcement period abnormal returns
with Eventus, an event study application explained in our “Methodology” section. The data for
the acquisitions are all U.S. deals for nonfinancial companies from Zephyr, a database of deal
information, such as details of deals, deal rumors, and financial summaries and structures of
firms involved in deals. For more information on Zephyr, see
http://www.bvdinfo.com/Products/Economic-and-M-A/M-A/ZEPHYR.aspx. Our acquisition
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data includes the rumor date, date of acquisition announcement, deal completion date, deal value,
percentage of initial and final stake, acquirer and target names, and acquirer CUSIP.
The other set of data consists of covenant violation information from Nini, Smith, and
Sufi (2010), financial information for firms on a quarterly basis taken from Compustat.
Compustat is a database of U.S. and Canadian fundamental and market information for over
24,000 companies, providing annual and quarterly financial statements and supplemental data.
For more information on Compustat, see http://www.compustat.com/myproducts.aspx. For our
data, the broadest sample of Compustat observations contains of 7,661 non-financial U.S. firms
and 181,702 firm-quarter observations from the second quarter of 1997 to the fourth quarter of
2008. The main focus of this data is an indicator of whether or not the firm reports a violation of
a financial covenant during the corresponding quarter.
Construction of the covenant violation data begins with data for all nonfinancial U.S.
firms in Compustat from1996 to 2008, initially limited to only firms with average book assets
greater than $10 million in 2000 dollars and to firm-quarter observations with five available data
items (total assets, total sales, common shares outstanding, closing share price, and the calendar
quarter of the filing). Next, Nini, Smith, and Sufi investigate the firms’ 10-K and 10-Q SEC
filings, using a text-search algorithm that first locates the word “covenant” in the filing, and then
conditional on finding the word “covenant,” searches for the following five terms within seven
lines surrounding the initial hit: “waiv,” “viol,” “in default,” “modif,” and “not in compliance.”
Then they manually check the filings mentioning covenant violations. Finally, they merge the
data from Compustat with the data generated from their algorithm.
Our data centers on new financial covenant violations, defined as financial covenant
violations for firms that have not violated a covenant in the previous four quarters. The focus is
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on new financial covenant violations because they reveal the initial measure of creditor
intervention, providing the cleanest identification of the effect of violations on corporate
behavior. A firm-quarter observation is only included in the sample if there exist four previous
quarters to measure whether a given violation is new. For more details about the construction of
this data, see Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2010).
B. Formation of Samples
The previous construction of data from Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2010) allow us to start with
a 10,722 sample size for acquisitions and 273,509 sample size for covenant violations. We have
to arrange the data into three separate samples, for acquisitions that occurred within four quarters
after a covenant violation, acquisitions that occurred within four quarters before a covenant
violation but without a covenant violation within the previous four quarters, and acquisitions that
fit neither of the previous two categories. This way, the first two samples, in which recent
violations occurred, would be treatment samples, and the last sample, in which recent violations
did not occur, could serve as an overall control sample.
To form the samples, we first match the CUSIP numbers for acquirers in the dataset for
acquisitions with those for acquirers in the dataset for covenant violations. Then we place the
data that did not match up by CUSIP into the control sample, generating a smaller sample size to
work with. Then we write an Excel macro that compares all the acquisitions’ announcement
dates with covenant violations dates to identify the acquisitions in which violations occurred
within four quarters. The announcement date we use is the earliest of the actual announcement
date, rumor date, and actual acquisition date, to represent the earliest date that acquisition
information is leaked to the stock market. After we obtain this data, we put the data that do not
match the date criteria into the control group. Then we use Excel to sort the remaining data into
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acquisitions that occurred within four quarters before the covenant violation and acquisitions that
occurred within four quarters after the covenant violation without a covenant violation within
four quarters before, completing our two treatment samples. We end up with a sample size of
598 for Violation Before Acquisition, 569 for Violation After Acquisition, and 9555 for No
Violation. These sample sizes sometimes diminish slightly during our analysis due to some
acquirer data experiencing incompatibility with Eventus and lack of certain acquisition details.
C. Sample Characteristics
After forming the samples, we collect data on the target firm deal size, industry match,
and deal financing for each of the three samples. The target deal size, denominated in millions of
assets, is from the previously constructed dataset. For the industry match, we use Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, which are used to classify a company’s main business. We
check if the acquirer and target have the same first two digits in their SIC codes, which represent
the major industry group, and if they have the same first full SIC codes, which represent the
industry, a more specific classification. For industry match we use a dummy variable for each of
the two situations, assigning 1 if the SIC codes match up and assigning 0 otherwise. Next, we
look for what type of deal financing each of the three samples use, checking to see if each
transaction is financed mainly by cash or stock. We focus on cash and stock because these make
up the vast majority of financing types. We also use a dummy variable for each of the two
situations, cash and stock, assigning 1 if the acquisition uses the given financing type and 0
otherwise. For each characteristic for each sample, we calculate the required numbers to perform
t-tests to judge the statistical significance of differences between two samples at a time: mean
difference, standard deviations, and sample sizes.
D. Summary Statistics
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Table 1 presents our summary statistics. For each of the three samples, we reveal the
mean cumulative abnormal returns and sample sizes for days -30 to 30 and days -3 to 2, the two
time windows that we focus on the most. We also reveal the mean and sample sizes for the
acquisition type characteristics: target firm deal size, industry match and major industry group
match, and cash and stock financing. Later, we will expand upon and analyze both the mean
cumulative abnormal return data and acquisition type characteristics data mentioned in our
summary statistics.

V. Methodology
We use Eventus to determine the abnormal returns around the announcement period and
compare cross-sectional returns. Eventus performs event studies, allowing the user to have
control over estimation periods and cumulative return windows, as well as a choice of
benchmarks, such as comparison period mean returns, market returns, and the market model. For
more information on Eventus, see Arnold R. Cowen’s Eventus 8.0 Users Guide. The
announcement date is day 0, with day -1 as the day before the announcement. We focus on days 3 to 2. Eventus measures the abnormal return as
ARit = Rit – E(Rit|Xt)
given that i is the firm and t is the event date. Rit is the actual ex-post return of security i, and
E(Rit|Xt) is the expected return without conditioning that the event will take place over the event
window. For a conceptual diagram regarding Eventus, see Figure 4.
For Eventus, we set the estimation period used to measure E(Rit|Xt) as the default with
the end before the event date as day -46, the minimum estimation length as 3 days, and the
maximum estimation length as 255 days. We find the mean daily abnormal returns and mean
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cumulative abnormal return for time windows for days -30 to 30, -30 to -2, -3 to 2, 1 to 30, -1 to
1, -2 to 2, and -2 to 30. Each time, we use a single-factor market model estimated based on
ordinary least squares for the estimation period. We also select options for both the equally
weighted index and value-weighted index. The equally weighted index weighs all NYSE,
AMEX, and Nasdaq stocks equally, while the value-weighted index weighs them based on value.
Our focus is on the time windows for days -30 to 30, which give the most comprehensive view
of the trend of the abnormal returns across time, and days -3 to 2, which centers in on the trend
of the abnormal returns across time around the acquisition period. We graph the mean
cumulative returns across time for these two time windows for both the equally weighted index
and value-weighted index to visually capture the trends.
Next, we look for differences in target firm deal size, industry match, and deal financing
across the three samples. We use independent t-tests for samples of unequal sizes and unequal
variances to compare two samples at a time for each characteristic, in order to determine whether
the differences in the means for characteristics between the two samples are statistically
significant at the 0.05 level of significance for a two-tailed test. We use the following formula for
t-tests:

VI. Results
A. Announcement Period Abnormal Returns
For Figure 5, we can notice clear trends in the graphs of the mean cumulative abnormal
return for days -30 to 30. The trends are consistent between the equally weighted index and
15

value-weighted index. Well before the acquisition date, the mean cumulative abnormal returns of
the three samples are very similar and slightly below 0.00%. However, on the acquisition
announcement date, the abnormal return for Violation Before Acquisition increases significantly
more than that for Violation After Acquisition. The abnormal return for Violation After
Acquisition increases significantly more than No Violation, which stays close to a 0.00% mean
cumulative abnormal return. For graphs of the time window for days -3 to 2, see Figure 6 and the
corresponding cumulative abnormal return from Table 2. Table 2 indicates that for the equally
weighted index, Violation Before Acquisition experiences a 3.07% mean cumulative abnormal
return, while Violation After Acquisition experiences 1.52% and No Violation experiences
0.72%. For the value-weighted index, Violation Before Acquisition experiences a 3.00% mean
cumulative abnormal return, while Violation After Acquisition experiences 1.51% and No
Violation experiences 0.65%.
The much greater increase in abnormal return for Violation Before Acquisition may
support our hypothesis that after a company violates a loan covenant, creditors only allow the
company’s management to make acquisitions that add value to the firm. The stock market
recognizes this and views the acquisition as favorable to the shareholders, reflecting the high
abnormal returns during the announcement period. We also think that for the Violation After
Acquisition acquirers, the creditors can predict that these companies may violate a loan covenant
soon. Therefore, they are strict in only allowing the company’s management to make
acquisitions that benefit the firm’s value but are less strict than they would be for a firm that has
actually violated a loan covenant. As a result, the announcement period abnormal return is higher
than that for the control group No Violation but lower than that for Violation Before Acquisition.
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After this point, the mean cumulative abnormal returns for all three samples drop.
However, Violation After Acquisition drops the most dramatically, and No Violation drops the
least dramatically, falling much less than the others from days 1 to 30. The differences in such
drops are evident from both Figure 5 and Table 2’s results for the time window for days 1 to 30.
Table 2 indicates that for the equally weighted index, Violation After Acquisition experiences a 3.78% mean cumulative abnormal return, while Violation Before Acquisition experiences 1.53% and No Violation experiences -1.05%. For the value-weighted index, Violation After
Acquisition experiences a -4.43% mean cumulative abnormal return, while Violation Before
Acquisition experiences -1.94% and No Violation experiences -1.50%.Such drops in abnormal
returns after the announcement period may indicate that the market overreacted to the
acquisitions announcement. Also, the steepness of Violation After Acquisition’s drop in
abnormal return may indicate that the stock market’s pessimistic prediction of an impending loan
covenant violation begins to override its optimistic sentiment towards the acquisition. For mean
cumulative abnormal returns for all time windows for both the equally weighted index and valueweighted index, see Table 2.
B. Types of Acquisitions
We apply the two-tailed t-tests to the acquisitions’ characteristics of target firm deal size,
industry match, and deal financing. For target firm deal size, it is evident from Table 3 that No
Violation’s mean target firm deal size is significantly different from those of Violation Before
Acquisition and Violation After Acquisition for the 0.05 level of significance. On the other hand,
Violation Before Acquisition and Violation After Acquisition are not significantly different. For
both major industry group match and industry match, Table 4 shows that there are no significant
differences between sample means. For deal financing, Table 5 shows that only the t-statistics for
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the mean difference between Violation Before Acquisition and No Violation seem significant for
both cash financing and stock financing. However, we conclude that despite the t-tests, these
sample means may not be actually significantly different. No Violation’s comparatively very
large sample size greatly shrinks the standard error for the t-test, and the mean differences of the
two samples do not seem drastically different in terms of magnitude.
From these results, it seems that the only significant mean differences are those for target
firm deal size between Violation Before Acquisition and No Violation, and between Violation
After Acquisition and No Violation. The target firm deal size is much smaller for Violation
Before Acquisition and Violation After Acquisition, than for No Violation. This may be an
indication that when a firm violated a covenant or is about to violate a covenant, creditors may
limit the deal size of acquisitions. This is in line with the figure that reveals a dramatic decrease
in acquisitions after the loan covenant violation date. Overly large acquisitions may be both too
expensive and too risky, thus absorbing too many cash flows and diminishing firm value. Since
the other t-test produced insignificant results, we do not reach any strong conclusions for
industry match and deal financing.

VII. Conclusion
From our research, it seems that firms undergo significant shifts of corporate governance
when a loan covenant is violated or about to be violated. Power shifts from management to the
creditors, as creditors impose stricter rules, such as limiting the size of acquisition targets. The
stock market likely realizes these shifts in power and views them as beneficial for firm value.
This favorable perspective is reflected in positive acquisition announcement period abnormal
returns for acquirers that violate a loan covenant near the announcement date.
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Even though our conclusions are supported by convincing results and background
research, we must realize that there are many factors that come into play when firms violate loan
covenants and undergo acquisitions. There exist numerous business and economic reasons why
firms fail to satisfy loan covenants and decide to pursue acquisitions. To extend our research
further, it may be helpful to examine many of the other acquisition type characteristics, such as
acquirer size in assets, geographic region, and number of previous acquisitions by the acquirer.
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Figure 1 – Effect of Financial Covenant Violation on Acquisitions
This figure presents the mean and median for cash acquisitions scaled by average assets after a
financial covenant violation occurs for a firm that has not violated in the previous four quarter.
The violation is first reported at quarter 0, implying that it occurred sometime between quarter -1
and 0.
Source: Nini, Greg, David C. Smith, and Amir Sufi (2010)
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Figure 2 – Financial Covenant Violations and Stock Price Performance (Event Time)
This figure displays results from a stock price event study around the occurrence of a new
covenant violation by estimating the event-study monthly abnormal returns of stocks following
the report of a new loan covenant violation in their SEC 10-K or 10-Q filing. A new violation is
a violation by a firm that has not violated in the previous four quarters. The estimates are for
event months September 1997 through June 2009 and include 3,699 observations. The violation
occurs at month 0, and the figure shows monthly cumulative average abnormal return estimates
beginning one year before the violation. Abnormal returns are measured against a four-factor
return model, measured on a monthly basis, are: (1) the excess return on the NYSE/AMEX
market return, (2) the difference between the returns on small and big stocks, (3) the return
performance of value stocks relative to growth stocks, and (4) the return performance of high
momentum stocks relative to low momentum stocks.
Source: Nini, Greg, David C. Smith, and Amir Sufi (2010)
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Figure 3 – Financial Covenant Violations and Stock Price Performance (Calendar Time)
This figure displays cumulative stock returns for a covenant violator portfolio and the implied
return for a portfolio of all stocks (including non-violators) of similar risk as measured a by fourfactor benchmark model. The figure covers the period September 1997 through March 2010, and
includes violations reported between September 2007 and June 2009. The covenant violator
portfolio is formed by purchasing stocks of firms that report a new covenant violation and
holding the stocks for 2 years. A new violation is a violation by a firm that has not violated in the
previous four quarters. The stocks are purchased on the first trading day of the month following
the reported violation, and the portfolio is equally weighted. The implied returns are constructed
using a 4-factor benchmark portfolio based on: (1) the excess return on the NYSE/AMEX market
return, (2) the difference between the returns on small and big stocks, (3) the return performance
of value stocks relative to growth stocks, and (4) the return performance of high momentum
stocks relative to low momentum stocks.
Source: Nini, Greg, David C. Smith, and Amir Sufi (2010)
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Figure 4 – Eventus Diagram
This figure presents how Eventus calculates abnormal returns. The returns from the estimation
window are used to estimate the parameters, which are used to calculate the abnormal return.
The event window represents the days for which abnormal returns are calculated. The estimation
window and event window are chosen by the user.
Source: Gines (2008)
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Figure 5 – Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Days -30 to 30
These two graphs are of the mean cumulative abnormal returns for the three samples Violation
Before Acquisition, Violation After Acquisition, and No Violation, across the time window (-30,
30). Both graphs’ data are from Eventus, using the market model. The first graph uses the
equally weighted index, and the second uses the value-weighted index.
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No Violation

Figure 6 – Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Days -3 to 2
These two graphs are of the mean cumulative abnormal returns for the three samples Violation
Before Acquisition, Violation After Acquisition, and No Violation, across the time window (-3,
2). Both graphs’ data are from Eventus, using the market model. The first graph uses the equally
weighted index, and the second uses the value-weighted index.
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Table 1 – Summary Statistics
This table presents a summary of data that we expand upon and analyze throughout our research.
For both cumulative abnormal returns and acquisition type characteristics, we reveal the means
and sample sizes for all three samples.
Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns

(-30,30) Mean CAR
(-3, +2) Mean CAR
Count

Market Model, Equally Weighted Index
Violation Before Acquisition Violation After Acquisition No Violation
0.03%
-3.27%
-1.14%
3.07%
1.52%
0.72%
517
490
7973

(-30,30) Mean CAR
(-3, +2) Mean CAR
Count

Market Model, Value-Weighted Index
Violation Before Acquisition Violation After Acquisition No Violation
-0.13%
-3.47%
-1.64%
3.00%
1.51%
0.65%
517
490
7973
Acquisition Type Characteristics

Mean
Count

Target Firm Deal Size ($ Mil)
Violation Before Acquisition Violation After Acquisition No Violation
151.429
123.226
359.488
412
419
6206

Mean
Count

Industry Match
Violation Before Acquisition Violation After Acquisition No Violation
0.296
0.346
0.315
598
569
9555

Mean
Count

Major Industry Group Match
Violation Before Acquisition Violation After Acquisition No Violation
0.515
0.538
0.523
598
569
9555

Mean
Count

Cash Financing
Violation Before Acquisition Violation After Acquisition No Violation
0.518
0.587
0.595
510
482
7857

Mean
Count

Stock Financing
Violation Before Acquisition Violation After Acquisition No Violation
0.322
0.253
0.250
510
482
7857
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Table 2 – Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Various Time Windows
This table presents mean cumulative returns for the three samples Violation Before Acquisition,
Violation After Acquisition, and No Violation, for various time windows. Both sections use the
market model. The first section uses the equally weighted index, and the second uses the valueweighted index. Violation Before Acquisition includes 517 acquisitions, Violation After
Acquisition includes 490 acquisitions, and No Violation includes 7973 to 7975 acquisitions,
depending on the time window.
Market Model, Equally Weighted Index
Days
(-30,30)
(-3, +2)
(-30, -2)
(+1, +30)
(-1, +1)
(-2, +2)
(-2, +30)

Violation Before Acquisition
0.03%
3.07%
0.09%
-1.53%
2.94%
3.03%
0.53%

Violation After Acquisition
-3.27%
1.52%
-0.11%
-3.78%
1.29%
1.38%
-2.78%

No Violation
-1.14%
0.72%
-0.43%
-1.05%
0.64%
0.74%
-0.61%

Market Model, Value-Weighted Index
Days
(-30,30)
(-3, +2)
(-30, -2)
(+1, +30)
(-1, +1)
(-2, +2)
(-2, +30)

Violation Before Acquisition
-0.13%
3.00%
0.02%
-1.94%
2.91%
3.01%
0.09%
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Violation After Acquisition
-3.47%
1.51%
0.28%
-4.43%
1.30%
1.35%
-3.43%

No Violation
-1.64%
0.65%
-0.48%
-1.50%
0.61%
0.68%
-1.10%

Table 3 – Target Firm Deal Size, Mean Differences
This table presents the t-statistics and the values of the variables needed to calculate the twotailed t-tests used. The target firm deal size is measured in $ millions of assets. The t-statistics for
statistically significant mean differences at the 0.05 significance level are highlighted in yellow.
Target Firm Deal Size ($ Mil)

Mean
Count

Difference
t

Violation Before Acquisition Violation After Acquisition No Violation
151.429
123.226
359.488
412
419
6206
VBA & VAA
28.202
0.653

VBA & NV
-208.060
-4.068
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VAA & NV
-236.262
-6.871

Table 4 – Major Industry Group Match and Industry Match, Mean Differences
This table presents the t-statistics and the values of the variables needed to calculate the twotailed t-tests used. Major Industry Group Match and Industry Match are both dummy variables.
The t-statistics for statistically significant mean differences at the 0.05 significance level are
highlighted in yellow.
Major Industry Group Match

Mean
Count

Difference
t

Violation Before Acquisition Violation After Acquisition No Violation
0.515
0.538
0.523
598
569
9555
VBA & VAA
-0.023
-0.015

VBA & NV
-0.008
-0.401

VAA & NV
0.014
0.664

Industry Match

Mean
Count

Difference
t

Violation Before Acquisition Violation After Acquisition No Violation
0.296
0.346
0.315
598
569
9555
VBA & VAA
-0.050
-0.041

VBA & NV
-0.019
-0.982

30

VAA & NV
0.031
1.526

Table 5 – Cash Financing and Stock Financing, Mean Differences
This table presents the t-statistics and the values of the variables needed to calculate the twotailed t-tests used. Cash Financing and Stock Financing are both dummy variables.
Cash Financing

Mean
Count

Difference
t

Violation Before Acquisition Violation After Acquisition No Violation
0.518
0.587
0.595
510
482
7857
VBA & VAA
-0.069
-0.045

VBA & NV
-0.077
-3.383

VAA & NV
-0.008
-0.335

Stock Financing

Mean
Count

Difference
t

Violation Before Acquisition Violation After Acquisition No Violation
0.322
0.253
0.250
510
482
7857
VBA & VAA
0.068
0.059

VBA & NV
0.072
3.378
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VAA & NV
0.003
0.166

